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"The exact meaning and intent of this so-called tenure policy
eludes us. Its vaporous objectives, purposes, and procedures are
lost in a fog of nebulous verbiage."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Academic tenure is under attack in many universities and
by critics of higher education. There are attempts to reduce its
privileges, to utilize long-term contracts in its stead, to engage
in post-tenure review so as to discharge underperforming
faculty, and to expedite the procedural process to make it easier
to terminate tenured academics. 2 Throughout higher education
1. Worzella v. Bd. of Regents, 93 N.W.2d 411, 412 (S.D. 1958).
2. See Fred L. Morrison, Tenure Wars: An Account of the Controversy at Min-
nesota, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 369 (1997); Northwestern Professor Sues, Seeking Pay in
Tenure Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1997, at A21; Patrick Healy, A Take-No-Pris-
oners Approach to Changing Public Higher Education in Massachusetts, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 5, 1997, at A41 (discussing how the chairman of the state
Board of Education seeks to end the scam of tenure). The president of the Ameri-
can Association of University Professors claimed that he was denounced wherever
he went, stating "It's 360-degree bashing.... All around us, people are throwing
things. I've been a teacher for 33 years, and I can tell you it's never been this bad."
William H. Honan, The Ivory Tower Under Siege, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 4, 1998, § 4A, at
33. "Shiftless, lazy good-for-nothings? Richly paid leftist professors securely en-
sconced in their irrelevant ivory towers." David Horowitz, The Loafing Class, (Feb.
9, 1998) <http://www.salon.com>. There is even a board game, "Survival of the
Witless," which satirizes the tenure process. Denise K. Magner, Play Your Cards
Right and You, Too, Can Earn Tenure, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 11, 1998, at
A16. Tenure according to the rules of the game is "the key to fame, wealth, happi-
ness and most importantly, to never having to put in a single day's work again."
Id. Players draw cards to determine the gender, class, sexual orientation and
whether they are either "hopelessly white" or "desperately minority." Id.
Though criticism has reached a crescendo, it has been harsh in the past. One
recalls Edward Gibbon's vicious description of the faculty at Oxford in the eight-
eenth century:
Instead of animating the under-graduates by the example of diligence, they
enjoyed in tranquil indolence the benefactions of the founder, and their
slumbers were seldom disturbed by the labor of writing, of reading, or think-
ing. Their discourse in the common room, to which I was sometimes admit-
ted, stagnated in the narrow circle of college business and Tory politicks;
their deep and dull compotations left them no right to censure the warmer
intemperance of youth; and their constitutional toasts were not expressive
of the most sincere loyalty to the house of Hanover.
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF EDWARD GIBBON 226 (John Murray ed., 1897).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss1/3
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there has been a movement away from tenured faculty slots
through the use of non-tenure track positions. 3
In one view, tenure seems a preposterous and outmoded
idea. Individuals are judged by their fellow employees after a
few probationary years, and if favorably reviewed and the judg-
ment is affirmed by the employer-the usual case-the individ-
ual receives lifetime employment. Universities seem unable to
remove faculty members despite their incompetence or neglect
of duties.4 From another perspective, tenure is a flexible con-
cept, and does not constitute a barrier to removal of faculty
members who are professionally deficient. Rather, tenure en-
ables academic institutions to achieve their educational goals.
This article attempts to defend academic tenure and offer
some recommendations to make it more effective. There is
nothing unique in this effort. What might be new to the discus-
sion is the belief that the catalyst to making tenure more flexi-
ble and effective lies not with the professorate relinquishing
some of its rights, but with university administrators creating
an environment of expectations and incentives for tenured
3. Many universities use armies of adjuncts who may teach at several institu-
tions. No matter what the quality of instruction they provide, adjunct faculty do
not have the same investment in or commitment to the university at which they
serve. Nor do they have the benefits or privileges. Adjuncts do not set curricula,
help or assist students in a substantial way, or participate in university or depart-
mental governance. Tenure may well be withering of its own accord. See Brent
Staples, The End of Tenure?, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1997, § IV, at 14. Data from the
U.S. Department of Education and the American Association of University Profes-
sors indicates that only about 25% of America's 1.2 million college teachers are
tenured. Of those who do not have tenure only 40% are eligible to apply for it,
down from 60% a few years ago. See id. The most recent data collected in January
of 2000 from the National Center for Education Statistics indicates that in 1997,
67.4% of faculty members worked full-time, 32.6% part-time. See Courtney
Leatherman, Colleges Continue to Hire More Part-Time Faculty Members, Govern-
ment Study Finds, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 19, 2000, at 2. At two year institu-
tions only 35.4% worked full-time. See id. Overall part-timers now make up an
estimated 42% of college instructors nationwide, compared to 22% in 1970. See
Robin Wilson, Contracts Replace the Tenure Track for a Growing Number of Profes-
sors, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 12, 1998, at A12. This trend is considered likely
to continue. See Courtney Leatherman, Growth in Positions Off the Tenure Track
Is a Trend That's Here to Stay, Study Finds, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., April 9, 1999,
at A14.
4. See generally ARvAL A. MORRIS, DISMISSAL OF TENURED HIGHER EDUCATION
FACULTY: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ELIMINATION OF MANDATORY RETIREMENT
(1992) (offering an excellent summary of the caselaw dealing with dismissal of
tenured faculty and procedures to be used in such situations).
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faculty, developing the fortitude and procedures to make tenure
work as it should, and encouraging faculty to exercise the re-
sponsibilities that accompany their status.
William W. Van Alstyne, a former president of the Ameri-
can Association of University Professors and a faculty member
at Duke Law School, has defined our subject as: "Tenure, accu-
rately and unequivocally defined, lays no claim whatever to a
guarantee of lifetime employment. Rather, tenure provides
only that no person continuously retained as a full-time faculty
member beyond a specified lengthy period of probationary ser-
vice may thereafter be dismissed without adequate cause."5
Basically, tenure protects the faculty member in three di-
rect ways: 1) it safeguards academic freedom, a subject which
will be discussed below; 2) it ensures fair procedures when one
is threatened with dismissal; and 3) building upon the second, it
provides security of employment. Thus, tenure essentially re-
quires fairness before one is dismissed from a position, thereby
giving expectation of continued employment.6
This rather benign definition is not how it is perceived by
many. It is sometimes difficult to find anyone to say something
nice about tenure. In the felicitous words of Ralph Brown and
Jordan Kurland, ". . . academic tenure is always under attack
[emphasis in original]. Usually we hear only grumbling and
rumbling, as of distant artillery. But occasionally there is a pro-
longed fire-fight."7 The author once walked into a meeting of a
university-wide committee as an administrator was com-
5. See Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and "Defense," 57 AAUP Bull. 328
(1971).
6. The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Ten-
ure of the American Association of University Professors, drafted by faculty and
college presidents and endorsed by the Association of American Colleges, repre-
senting universities and 156 professional organizations as of 1995, states that:
Tenure is a means to certain ends, specifically: (1) freedom of teaching and
research and of extramural activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic
security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability.
Freedom and economic security, hence, tenure are indispensable to the suc-
cess of an institution in fulfilling its obligations to students and to society.
American Association of University Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles on Ac-
ademic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS
3, 3 (1995) [hereinafter 1940 Statement].
7. Ralph S. Brown & Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and Academic
Freedom, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 327 (1990).
162 [Vol. 21:159
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plaining: "Why, the professors are worse than civil servants, at
least they [civil servants] work from nine to five." The adminis-
trator's attitude is common though the analogy to the civil ser-
vice is misplaced, for the primary rationale for civil service
status is economic security while that of tenure is the protection
of academic freedom. The most analogous group in society to
tenured professors are federal judges, who receive life-time ap-
pointments to assure their independence, so they will reach de-
cisions on the basis of legal principle irrespective of the power of
the litigants or the pressures of other branches of government.
Tenure insulates faculty members from retribution for what
they investigate, what they say and teach in class, and what
they write.8 It also protects, to some degree, their extramural
utterances. 9
A. A (Very) Brief Overview of the History of Tenure in the
United States
The concept of tenure dates to the twelfth century and was
widely recognized throughout Europe.10 In fact, the medieval
period may have been tenure's golden age, for scholars were ex-
empted from service in the army as well as from payment of
taxes." In America in the eighteenth century, the relationship
8. See Merton C. Bernstein, In Praise of Tenure: A Cautionary Essay, 71
WASH. U.L.Q. 1017, 1019 (1993).
9. See American Association of University Professors, Committee A Statement
on Extramural Utterances, reprinted in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 32
(1995).
10. See WALTER METZGER, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay, in
FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION ON ACA-
DEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 93, 94 (1973) [hereinafter METZGER, Aca-
demic Tenure in America].
11. The rights, privileges and immunities of medieval scholars were products
of the social needs of their time. See PEARL KIBRE, SCHOLARLY PRMLEGES IN THE
MIDDLE AGES: THE RIGHTS, PRMLEGES, IMMUNITIES OF SCHOLARS AND UNIVERSI-
TIES AT BOLOGNA, PADUA, PARIS & OXFORD 325 (1962). They were supplemented by
Roman civil and canon law and by the 12th century authentica habita or
privilegium scholasticum. See id. The privileges or privilegium, in the sense of
compensation or favor, were given to those whose activities were regarded as both
necessary and beneficial to the public welfare under the authentica habita. See id.
Privileges exempted scholars from payment of all local taxes, and from all civic
duties and responsibilities, as well as from military service, and the performance
of guard duties, except under unusual circumstances. See id. They gave scholars
guarantee of imperial or royal protection on the way to, from, and at the place of
the schools. They also gave scholars freedom from the application of the law of
5
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between professor and the university was contractual in nature,
but with the emergence of endowed chairs, the incumbents of
such positions were granted life-time or indefinite appoint-
ments. In the nineteenth century, by and large, appointments
were of indefinite nature and dismissals would be for adequate
cause. There was a presumption that faculty would be reap-
pointed, and they usually were, but this presumption was not
legally binding. Nor was there a consensus as to what was ade-
quate cause. In a legal sense in most jurisdictions, all appoint-
ments were temporary and instantly extinguishable, and many
boards of trustees so proceeded. 12
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, universi-
ties reflected a growing division of labor as the professorate re-
organized into departments reflecting the national specialist
organizations, such as the American Historical Association,
that were being formed at this time. This had several conse-
quences. One was that faculty had a more narrow professional
identity. Second, they became research scholars who could best
be evaluated by their peers, rather than by the university ad-
ministration or outsiders such as lay trustees.13 Faculty mem-
bers thus gained a bifurcated identity. They belonged to a
professional group across disciplines, the faculty, and were
professors within a discipline, economics, law or medicine, or-
reprisals, the right to be tried in ecclesiastical courts, and by judges of their own
choosing, and the right to summon their adversaries before those judges at the
place of the schools where they themselves could not be summoned to appear
outside the city walls. See id. They also exempted scholars from the jurisdiction of
the local civil courts and magistrates. See id.
The scope further expanded to granting exemptions for freedom from tolls and
taxes, the right to adequate housing and fair rents, the right to be compensated for
theft or destruction of property, the right to be protected from disturbing noises or
disturbing odors, particularly in Oxford, the right to be protected against uncle-
aned streets, unfair practices in the sale of foodstuffs and other commodities, and
against the use of fraudulent weights and measures. See id. Scholars at the Uni-
versity of Paris could not be excommunicated by local clergy except under the ex-
press will of the Pope. See id. at 326.
12. See METZGER, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 10, at 118, 122,
132-35 (1973).
13. See Thomas L. Haskell, Justifying the Rights of Academic Freedom in the
Era of "Power/Knowledge," in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 43, 45-46 (Louis
Menand ed., 1996).
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ganized by department or school. 14 Concurrently, the American
university was undergoing curricular and structural reform.
The problem of bureaucratic disconnectedness was solved by
bureaucratic responses, one of which resulted in faculty-admin-
istrative consultation. 15 It was but a short step to suggest that
faculty be involved in a judicial proceeding to determine
whether a peer should be dismissed.
The catalyst for tenure as we know it in the United States
was the firing in 1900 of a young economist at Leland Stanford
Jr. University, E.A. Ross. A precursor to many others in the
dismal science, Ross was an activist and interested in public
policy. At a time when most economists were Republicans, Ross
endorsed the idea of free silver and supported William Jennings
Bryan for the presidency. Stanford University had been
founded and funded by Leland Stanford, president of the Union
Pacific Railroad. Upon Stanford's death, his widow, Jane
Lothrope Stanford, who gave new meaning to the phrase "battle
axe," became the sole trustee of the university.' 6 Offended by
14. See Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Ac-
ademic Freedom In America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1267 (1988) [hereinafter Metz-
ger, Two Definitions of Academic Freedom].
15. See METZGER, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 10, at 143. From
an economic perspective, as the "frontier of knowledge" advances, three problems
in the market for professors are created which universities must solve. These
problems are "specialization, obsolescence, and asymmetric information." Aloysius
Siow, Tenure and Other Unusual Personnel Practices in Academia, 14 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 152, 152 (1998). Professors must specialize to keep up with a discipline. See
id. "At the departmental level, as specialization increases, more and more profes-
sors are needed to cover a discipline." Id. at 153. "Increasing specialization exac-
erbates the informational asymmetries," making it more difficult for the university
to make personnel decisions. Id. Faculty will have more knowledge about their
colleagues' abilities and the field than the university administrator. See id. Ten-
ure encourages individual professors to specialize, and enables peer review to over-
come the university's informational deficiency in making sound hiring and
promotion decisions. See id. at 156, 160. Peer review then becomes the univer-
sity's monitoring mechanism of its employees. See id. at 160. Thus, faculty-ad-
ministrative consultation serves as an efficient organizational advantage for
university administrations of research institutions. See id. at 153, 154.
16. By the terms of the founding grant of Stanford University, the former
Governor of California and United States Senator Leland Stanford and his
wife were to exercise complete control over the university; in the event of the
death of either, the survivor would assume absolute power. Consequently,
when Senator Stanford died in 1893, just two years after founding the uni-
versity, this 'unusual oligarchy' as Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metz-
ger have aptly phrased it, was converted into a 'still more unusual
7
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Ross's politics and activism, she ordered the university's presi-
dent, David Starr Jordan, to fire him.17 Instead, Jordan
granted Ross a sabbatical, and thereafter transferred him to the
sociology department with the title of professor of sociology.
Mrs. Stanford then promulgated a ban on all political activity,
but Ross ignored it.' s She ordered Ross fired. Other members
of the Stanford faculty also were terminated on Mrs. Stanford's
order. Ross, however, was an able self-publicist, and the terma-
gant of Stanford an easy foil with which to publicize the cause of
academic freedom. At the annual convention of the American
Economic Association in December of 1900 the Association con-
ducted an inquiry into the Ross case, using procedures that
were later adopted by Committee A of the American Association
of University Professors. There were other dismissals after
Ross, the most notable one involved a professor at Wesleyan in
Middletown, Connecticut. He was dismissed for a speech that
he made in another city in which he urged a less rigid obser-
vance of the Sabbath.' 9
In 1913 a group of Johns Hopkins professors issued a call to
colleagues from other leading universities to join them in the
formation of a national association of professors. The purpose
of the association was to protect their institutional interests,
specifically by the formulation of general principles respecting
tenure and legitimate grounds for dismissal of faculty. The as-
sociation was also to establish a representative judicial commit-
matriarchate' in which Mrs. Stanford alone exercised complete control over
the university.
James C. Mohr, Academic Turmoil and Public Opinion: The Ross Case at Stanford,
39 PAC. His. REV. 39, 41 (1970) (quoting RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZ-
GER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 437 (1955)).
It was not until 1903 that Mrs. Stanford relinquished absolute power to a board of
trustees. See id. at 41 n.8.
17. See Haskell, supra note 13, at 49; METZGER, Academic Tenure in America,
supra note 10, at 137-42; and Mohr, supra note 16, at 44.
18. Ross was no hero. The reason for his ouster was that he publicly con-
demned the use of "coolie" immigration and issued a plea for Anglo-Saxon racial
purity. See Haskell, supra note 13, at 49-50. Mr. Stanford's fortune was based on
oriental labor which built the Union Pacific Railway. See id. Mrs. Stanford felt
that her husband had been criticized. See id.
19. See METZGER, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 10, at 146. During
World War I, some professors who opposed the war on pacifist or socialist grounds
were fired. See Jon Wiener, Tenure Trouble, 45 DISSENT, Winter 1998, at 60. One
was singer Pete Seeger's father who was terminated from Berkeley. See id.
[Vol. 21:159
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tee to investigate and report on cases in which freedom is
alleged to have been interfered with by the administrative au-
thorities of any majority.20 Thus, the faculty was to judge ad-
ministrative conduct. The organization, the American
Association of University Professors (hereinafter AAUP), was
consciously modeled on the American Bar Association and the
American Medical Association as a link between professional-
ism and academic freedom. 21 In 1915, the AAUP published a
General Report on Academic Freedom and Tenure which deline-
ated firm procedures involving dismissal. It outlined the right
of the faculty, as a body, to judge the fitness of a current mem-
ber when brought into dispute, and to have a fair trial apart
from the administration. It was inappropriate "that the power
of determining when departures from the requirements of the
scientific spirit and method have occurred should be vested in
bodies not composed of members of the academic profession."22
The demand for professional autonomy and collegial self-gov-
ernance are at the heart of academic freedom. 23 The 1940 State-
ment of Principles, adopted by so many professional
organizations and universities, first introduced the concept of
tenure as economic security.
The 1915 Declaration of Principles viewed the expressive
freedom of academics as a corollary to the need for universities
to increase the sum of human knowledge, to provide general in-
struction to students and to furnish experts for public service.24
Central to the Declaration of Principles was the idea of institu-
tional neutrality and trustee restraint. 25 The 1915 Declaration
20. See METZGER, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 10, at 135.
21. See Haskell, supra note 13, at 53.
22. METZGER, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 10, at 149 (citing "Gen-
eral Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure,"
presented at the annual meeting of the association, December 31, 1915, AAUP Bul-
letin, 1915, 38-39).
23. See Haskell, supra note 13, at 54.
24. See General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure, 1 AAUP BULL. 17 (1915), reprinted in 53 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 393, 397
app. (1990) [hereinafter 1915 Declaration].
25. See Walter P. Metzger, Freedom and Tenure in the Academy: The Fiftieth
Anniversary of the 1940 Statement of Principles, 53 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 15
(Summer 1990) [hereinafter Metzger, Freedom and Tenure in the Academy]. The
beneficiaries of the 1915 declaration were faculty, not students. One should not
forget that this faculty autonomy was subsequently utilized to preserve a predomi-
nantly male WASP professorate. Not until 1967 did the AAUP issue a Joint State-
2000] 167
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identified three elements of academic freedom: freedom of in-
quiry and research; freedom of teaching within the university;
and freedom of extramural utterance and action.26 The third
aspect of academic freedom was placed in the Declaration be-
cause the AAUP had discovered that professors were more
likely to be punished for extramural utterances made in public,
outside of the university, than for anything said in the class-
room or done in the laboratory.27 The Declaration concluded
with a number of practical proposals for accomplishing its goals.
The 1915 Statement was a call for action by the AAUP. In 1925
a Conference Statement was signed by the Association of Ameri-
can Colleges but was a retreat, at least linguistically, from the
florid language of the previous decade. 28 The 1925 Statement
gave tenure rights to persons on permanent or long-term
appointments. 29
The 1940 Statement, jointly negotiated by the Association
of American Colleges and the AAUP, offered a new set of princi-
ples that have received widespread endorsement in higher edu-
cation.30 It embodied two new rationales. One was security of
employment, which was tied to years of service.31 The second
was that all dismissals, except for cases of financial exigency,
had to be for cause and reviewed through a trial-type proce-
dure.32 The procedural aspect was firmed up in a 1958 State-
ment on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal
Proceedings.33
ment on the Rights and Freedoms of Students. In 1976 a brief formal statement
on discrimination was adopted, though similar positions had been taken at earlier
annual meetings of the Association. See American Association of University
Professors, On Discrimination, reprinted in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS AND RE-
PORTS 147 (1995).
26. See 1915 Declaration, supra note 24, at 393.
27. See Metzger, Freedom and Tenure in the Academy, supra note 25, at 15.
28. See METZGER, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 10, at 151-52.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 152.
31. See id. at 153.
32. See id.
33. See American Association of University Professors, Statement on Procedu-
ral Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, reprinted in POLICY DOCUMENTS
AND REPORTS 11 (1995) [hereinafter Faculty Dismissal Proceedings]. See also
AALS Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Model Code of Procedure for
Academic Freedom and Tenure Cases, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1967).
168 [Vol. 21:159
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The 1940 Statement and its progeny are basically norma-
tive expressions. In many institutions they represent private
constitutional or contractual arrangements between the institu-
tion and its faculty. For example, the Pace University Faculty
Handbook specifies, "As a matter of principle, the University
supports the AAUP Statement on Academic Freedom and Ten-
ure. Academic tenure is a guarantee of academic freedom and
becomes an integral part of the contract between the individual
member of the faculty and Pace University."34 Thus, the 1940
Statement is essentially a consensual, ethical relationship be-
tween employer and employee. In the private university, ten-
ure is fundamentally a social compact. One should remember
that the constitutional aspects of tenure, ratified by the Su-
preme Court in a number of cases,35 protect the institution,
rather than the individual from external intrusion.36
At public institutions, the rights of the faculty member are
coextensive with those of public employees and bound by consti-
tutional precedent.37 At private institutions, tenure and aca-
demic freedom are a subject of contract, an agreement between
the faculty and institution, that the latter will grant certain
rights and be bound by the 1940 Statement.38 Tenure is more
than a grant to faculty of freedom and rights. In turn, the
faculty member has responsibilities. The only sanction against
a private university, unless tenure is violated for constitution-
34. PACE UNIVERSITY FACULTY HANDBOOK § 11.8 (1991).
35. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Bd. Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 236 (1957).
36. There is a need to distinguish "professional academic freedom," in the
words of the leading historian of the subject, Walter P. Metzger, which relates to
freedom of research and teaching, from "constitutional academic freedom" through
which the courts have protected universities by insulating scholarship and liberal
education from extramural political interference. Constitutional academic free-
dom protects the university from outside interference, rather than the individual
faculty member. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A Special Concern of the
First Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 251, 289 (1989); Brown & Kurland, supra note 7, at
335; Metzger, Two Definitions of Academic Freedom, supra note 14, at 1265.
37. See MORRIS, supra note 4, at 27-30.
38. At public institutions tenure disputes are a matter of state administrative
law, whereas at the private institution they are a matter of contract law. There
are differences in the standard of proof, and more importantly, in remedies. In the
private university context, courts are loath to award specific performance for
wrongful dismissal of a personal services contract. In contrast, in public institu-
tions where tenure is a matter of statute, reinstatement is ordered. See MORRIS,
supra note 4, at 27-30.
2000] 169
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ally impermissible reasons, is censure by the AAUP, and possi-
bly an action for breach of contract by the professor, though
contracts formally tendered by a university are for but one year.
B. Criticisms of Tenure
The attacks on academic tenure fall into several categories,
including the financial cost and resulting inflexibility to the in-
stitution, the creation of inappropriate incentives for faculty,
and the problems that result from lifetime employment. Admit-
tedly, some of the criticisms are deserved. Almost all institu-
tions in higher education are financially hard-pressed. The
easiest way to save money in a highly labor-intensive industry
like higher education is to reduce the size of the teaching staff,
particularly the more highly paid under-performers. This is an
option practically unavailable to universities with tenured
faculty, except under specific conditions of financial exigency 39
or in the relatively rare situation, for cause. The expense of the
tenure system diminishes an institution's opportunity to recruit
and retain a younger and more diverse faculty.40 Tenure has
been painted as a very one-sided contract binding the univer-
sity, but not really obligating faculty members to do more than
teach their classes. But this is an accusation that misunder-
stands the nature of faculty responsibilities and relationship to
the institution.41 Critics charge that academic tenure impairs
the obligee's powers to adjust their programs to meet changes in
demand beyond the drastic measures of dismissals for financial
exigency. 42 Related to this complaint is the allegation that ten-
ure imperils retrenchment at a time of financial decline. 43
Tenure, some critics allege, weakens incentives for excel-
lence, tolerates sloth, and has outlived its original purposes.44
Though the keystone of tenure is academic freedom, many
39. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, ON INSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM FINANCIAL EXIGENCY: SOME OPERATING GUIDELINES, re-
printed in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 193 (1995).
40. See COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE, FACULTY TENURE 14 (1973) [here-
inafter FACULTY TENURE].
41. See id.
42. HOWARD R. BOWEN & JACK H. SCHUSTER, AMERICAN PROFESSORS: A NA-
TIONAL RESOURCE IMPERILED 235 (1986).
43. See id.
44. See FACULTY TENURE, supra note 40.
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professors do not write, so tenure, it is alleged, is no longer es-
sential to its original goals. Some criticize the centrality of aca-
demic freedom to academic tenure, for academic freedom
applies to all teachers even if they lack tenure. 45 Tenure, it is
said, harbors the lazy, the incompetent and worse. It also un-
dermines the importance of classroom effectiveness. During the
probationary period, scholarship is emphasized, because it is
easier to measure than good teaching, and thereafter tenured
faculty prefer to focus upon research to which the professional
reward system is geared.46
Surveys present a different view about the relationship be-
tween teaching and scholarship than the critics assume. Con-
trary to common assumptions, there are significant differences
among faculty productivity rates across different kinds of insti-
tutions and throughout one's career. Several studies have indi-
cated that there seems to be no apparent reduction in
productivity rates after tenure, nor can either rank or career
age predict the percentage of time given to teaching or re-
search.47 The granting of tenure does not alone influence pro-
ductivity.48 Two studies have concluded that as faculty age,
their scholarly productivity declines, but interest in teaching in-
creases. 49 Without question, individuals who lack self-disci-
45. See id. at 15.
46. See id.
47. See James L. Bess, Contract Systems, Bureaucracies and Faculty Motiva-
tion: The Probable Effects of a No-Tenure Policy, 69 J. HIGHER EDUC. 3, 15 (1998);
ROBERT T. BLACKBURN & JANET H. LAWRENCE, FACULTY AT WORK: MOTIVATION,
EXPECTATION, SATISFACTION 204 (1995); Robert T. Blackburn & Janet H. Lawrence,
Aging and the Quality of Faculty Performance, 23 REV. EDUC. RESEARCH 265, 268
(1986) [hereinafter Blackburn & Lawrence, Aging]. It is extremely difficult to
draw generalizations about faculty career development because of the heterogene-
ity of disciplines, the differing types of colleges and universities (most studies are
of research institutions), the dearth of longitudinal studies, and the noncom-
parability of smaller investigations. See Robert T. Blackburn, Faculty Develop-
ment: Theory and Practice, in FACULTY VITALITY & INSTITUTIONAL PRODUCTIVITY
55, 61 (Shirley M. Clark & Darrell R. Lewis eds., 1985).
48. See Bess, supra note 47, at 15; Blackburn & Lawrence, Aging, supra note
47, at 276.
49. See Blackburn & Lawrence, Aging, supra note 47, at 273. According to a
survey published in 1996 by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching, the American professorate places greater emphasis in teaching over re-
search than any other country. See id. See also Sharon G. Levin & Paula E. Ste-
phan, Research Productivity Over the Life Cycle: Evidence for Academic Scientists,
81 AMER. ECON. REV. 114 (1991).
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pline and motivation will not thrive in a system where most
deadlines are self-imposed. As with every vocation, it is very
difficult to excel in any field of academic pursuit. However, ten-
ure allows professionals within the field of higher education to
take advantage of their autonomy, and to slacken off during
their careers.
A more valid critique is that tenure does not create tolera-
tion or openness toward innovation or alternative approaches.
Tenure has sometimes stifled originality by perpetuating the
existing academic order.50 In most law schools, there is a ca-
nonical approach as to whom should be eligible for the charmed
circle. Regrettably, in much of legal education, the academic
tenure system has excluded innovative approaches to learning,
such as clinical education and legal writing.
What particularly upsets some critics about tenure, and
may have been at the bottom of the high ranking official's gibe,
is the freedom that tenure affords to those who have it.5 1 Ten-
ured law school faculty often devote substantial time to outside
activities, ranging from the quest for social justice to the prac-
tice of law. In a society where many workers have little secur-
ity, and most jobs reflect the routinization and structure of so
much of modern life, tenure's license, combined with its secur-
ity, is bound to bring resentment. To be sure, many faculty can-
not handle such freedom and do little. To be successful, an
academic must be more structured and disciplined than those in
most other areas of employment.
C. Termination of Tenured Faculty
Perhaps the harshest criticism of tenure is that it erects an
impenetrable barrier to removing the teacher who cannot teach,
the scholar who cannot publish, or the miserable departmental
50. See HENRY RosovsKy, THE UNIVERSITY: AN OWNER'S MANUAL 207 (1990)
[hereinafter RosovsKy]. Rosovsky quotes a memorandum from fellow Harvard
faculty member John Kenneth Galbraith, "Faculty control of appointments can
sometimes be a means to self-perpetuating quality. It can more especially be a
means to self-perpetuating mediocrity. And in a world of change, it can be a pow-
erful tendency to academic obsolescence." Id.
51. See Christopher Shea, No Tenure, No Peace, 10 LINGUA FRANCA No. 8,
Nov. 2000, available at http:/www.linguafranca.com/print/0011/fieldnoten-
ture.html. Untenured professors are far from free because they have to establish
their scholarship and their teaching.
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or university citizen.5 2 Tenure affords, for all practical pur-
poses, life-time employment in an age when job insecurity is the
norm, even in sectors which formerly provided tenure-like sta-
tus. It has been nearly impossible to fire tenured faculty. Of
roughly 300,000 tenured professors in the United States, there
are approximately fifty formal dismissals for cause annually, 53
and an unknown number are informally settled. In over 300
years Harvard University has never stripped a professor of ten-
ure. Even though one murdered a colleague, he went to the gal-
lows with his tenure intact.5 4
There is an understandable frustration at the inability to
remove the miscreants, sloths, and other wrongdoers with what
should be greater ease. It is alleged that the difficulty of dis-
charging those with tenure encourages incompetence. Clearly,
this is not unique to higher education. The civil service at all
levels, union employees and others, have similar due process
rights. In the business world, mediocre chief executives often
continue in office until the mandatory retirement age despite
the harm to the corporation or the shareholders. 55 One of the
difficulties in higher education is that the procedures of removal
are so arduous and embarrassing, that few administrators are
52. See Brian G. Brooks, Adequate Cause for Dismissal: The Missing Element
in Academic Freedom, 22 J. C. & U. L. 331, 332 (1995). In the words of Robert
MacIver, tenure protects not only "the thinker, the intellectual pioneer, the social
critic but also the inert, the barely competent, the perfunctory reciter of ancient
lessons, and the one-time scholar who now devotes his best energies to more lucra-
tive pursuits." ROBERT MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME 240 (1955).
53. See Neil W. Hamilton, Peer Review: The Linchpin of Academic Freedom &
Tenure, Academe 15, 18, May-June 1997 [hereinafter Peer Review]; see also MOR-
RIS, supra note 4, at 80.
54. See SAMUEL ELIOT MORRISON, THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD 282-86
(Harvard University Press, 1936). The perpetrator was Professor John W. Web-
ster, who taught chemistry and mineralogy at Harvard College and the Medical
School for 25 years. See id. at 283. The victim was Dr. George Parkman, also on
the faculty of Harvard Medical School, who had lent money to Webster and unsuc-
cessfully attempted to collect his debt. See id. Dr. Parkman was killed for his
efforts in 1849. See id. at 282. Webster was hanged in 1850. See id. According to
E.J. Kahn, Jr.'s history of the University, "The minutes of the appropriate Medical
School faculty meeting simply stated that Dr. Webster was no longer around, that
his professional associates 'regretfully took note of action by the civil authorities,'
and that they had voted to fill the vacancy that existed 'in Dr. Webster's absence."'
E. J. KAHN, JR., HARVARD: THROUGH CHANGE AND THROUGH STORM 70 (1968).
55. See John J. Keller, Outside In, How AT&T's Directors Decided It Was
Time for Change at the Top, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1997 at Al.
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willing to take their time and that of the faculty, to prosecute
the cases. 56 The criticism of extensive due process procedures is
misguided.
Because of the concerns of academic freedom,57 the long
probationary period before tenure is granted, and the fact that
discharge for cause is for all practical purposes the end of an
academic career anywhere, termination of tenured faculty
should be difficult. The decision to terminate should be initially
reached by a judgment of one's peers, through a fair process
punctiliously followed. The difficulties lie not only with the de-
tailed requirements of the AAUP and other professional bod-
ies, 58 but because the matter will almost certainly be appealed
to the courts, further extending the cost and time in reaching
the final decision.59
The long term employment security provided by tenure has
been exacerbated by the uncapping of the retirement age in the
1986 amendments 60 to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 [hereinafter ADEA]61 which ended mandatory re-
tirement of faculty after December 31, 1993. Mandatory retire-
ment assured that some positions would open as older
professors were forced to make way for the younger generation,
who reflected the diversity of the modern university, possessed
new intellectual ideas, and were more likely to be productive
scholars. Mandatory retirement also provided an escape from
underperforming faculty whose lack of accomplishment did not
warrant the effort to dismiss for cause.
The impact of mandatory retirement is uncertain, as many
universities have implemented early retirement programs and
most faculty do retire by age seventy.62 Early retirement incen-
tives can be effective, but because they are voluntary, they may
56. See BOWEN & SCHUSTER, supra note 42, at 243.
57. See infra pp. 517-521.
58. See Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, supra note 33, at 12.
59. See Ann H. Franke, Why Battles Over Tenure Shouldn't End Up in the
Courtroom, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 11, 2000, at B6.
60. Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342 (1986) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 631(a)(1997)).
61. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (1997)).
62. See Denise K. Magner, An Aging Faculty Poses a Challenge for Colleges,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 8, 1997, at A10.
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not influence those very professors most in need of pasture.
There is, for example, the response of the professor who was
targeted by Stanford's early retirement plan, "Why should I re-
tire on half pay, when I'm retired now on full pay?" 63 There
have been other suggestions, including upon the granting of
tenure, the faculty member would sign a long term contract, up
to thirty-five years or more, or perhaps to age sixty five. At the
end of the term, tenure would expire and further employment
would be based upon term contracts. 64 The end of mandatory
retirement is a more manageable problem for higher education
than the difficulty of rescinding tenure after it has been
granted.
Despite the validity of many of these complaints, the tenure
system should be maintained. The positive attributes far out-
weigh its negative factors, and any alteration of the tenure sys-
tem would drastically change the relationship between faculty
and administrators and their governing boards, and more im-
portantly, between faculty and the student body.
II. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF TENURE
A. Tenure as a Guarantor of Academic Freedom
The primary argument in favor of the system of academic
tenure is that it is a guarantor of academic freedom. "Academic
freedom" is a non-legal concept, referring to the liberties
claimed by professors through professional channels against ad-
ministrative or political interference with research, teaching,
and governance. Academic freedom allows the professorate to
63. RosovsKY, supra note 50, at 216 n.2.
64. See Oscar M. Ruebhausen, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1986: Implications for Tenure and Retirement, 14 J. C. & U. L. 561,
569-73 (1988). An excellent argument has been made in Note: Questioning Age-
Old Wisdom: The Legality of Mandatory Retirement of Tenured Faculty Under the
ADEA, 105 HARV. L. REV. 889, 894-901 (1992), that the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 631(c)(1)(1997), should not apply to tenured faculty under the statute's "high
policymaker" exemption. The article cites NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S.
672, 679 (1980), for the proposition that faculty members were managerial person-
nel and not employees within the National Labor Relations Act. Note: Questioning
Age-Old Wisdom: The Legality of Mandatory Retirement of Tenured Faculty Under
the ADEA, 105 HARv. L. REV. 889, 895. Some litigation-seeking educational insti-
tution should make that argument. The case also would demonstrate how difficult
it is to challenge the tenure system.
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seek and discover, to teach and publish, without outside inter-
ference. 65 Historically speaking, academic freedom's heart and
soul lie not in free speech, but in professional autonomy and
collegial self-governance. It defends the community of disci-
plines that make up the modern university. 66 Academic free-
dom's linkage to tenure is that the requirement of a due process
hearing before termination for cause, protects the fundamental
values of the university: disinterested inquiry, reasoned and
critical discourse, and the ethos of liberal education. 67 Tenure
permits the faculty member to express unpopular academic
views and advance non-academic causes, to act upon knowledge
and ideas that one perceives using professional judgment with-
out fear of retribution from a latter day Mrs. Stanford, or of do-
nors, corporations, legislators or colleagues. 68
Fundamentally, academic freedom reflects the demands of
scholarly disciplines to pursue disinterested scholarship and
teaching, and to have their work and teaching evaluated accord-
ing to the discipline's standards of competence. These stan-
dards are determined through peer review, rather than through
the political, economic, or ideological filters of boards of trust-
ees, legislators or the community. 69 The job security that ten-
ure offers is conducive to such research and teaching, free from
the fear of penalty.70 The centrality of academic freedom within
65. See BOWEN & SCHUSTER, supra note 42, at 233; see generally MATTHEW W.
FINKIN, THE CASE FOR TENURE (Matthew W. Finkin, ed., 1996).
66. See Haskell, supra note 13, at 54.
67. Cf Byrne, supra note 36, at 388.
68. Cf RosovsKy, supra note 50, at 180. Even today unpopular speech brings
calls for resignation and dismissal. See, e.g., Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas Law Pro-
fessor Prompts A Furor Over Race Comments, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at A28.
In the 1980s Edward Schuh, a professor in the School of Agriculture at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota and later Dean of the Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public Af-
fairs, came out against farm subsidy payments at 90% of parity. See Wiener, supra
note 19, at 61. Farm price supports in farming states are as sacred as the words of
Kim I1 Sung in North Korea. See id. This created great controversy and the gover-
nor of Minnesota went to the university president and demanded Schuh be fired.
See id. The president said he couldn't because Schuh had tenure. See id. See also
Alison Schneider, A California State Professor is Attacked for His Defense of a Hol-
ocaust Denier, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 23, 2000, at A19.
69. Cf. Academic Freedom: A Special Concern, supra note 36, at 262, 278-79.
Academic freedom is curtailed at many religiously affiliated colleges, requiring
adherence to the college's faith.
70. The conventional justification for academic freedom is that it is instru-
mental in the discovery of truth. A system of independent academic institutions
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the university is elegantly described by Louis Menand of the
City University of New York:
Academic freedom is not simply a kind of bonus enjoyed by work-
ers within the system, a philosophical luxury universities could
function just as effectively, and much more efficiently without. It
is the key legitimating concept of the entire enterprise. Virtually
every practice of allowing departments to hire and fire their own
members to the practice of not allowing the football coach to influ-
ence the quarterback's grade in math class-derives from it.71
Tenure protects not only the individual faculty member,
but the integrity of the university. The nuances of academic
freedom are a more complex subject than this essay suggests.72
However, one should point out two things: academic freedom is
not the equivalent of liberty or license within the classroom or
in research, and it includes only the rights unique or necessary
to the functions of higher education. 73 Thus, members of a pro-
fession or discipline must adhere to the norms of that specialty
broadly defined. Administrators may exercise more extensive
control over curricular judgments than most would imagine, so
long as they do not attempt to punish a faculty member for his
or her political viewpoint. 74
We tend to believe that assaults on academic freedom are a
thing of the past, particularly of the McCarthy era, when, as the
writer Harold Brodkey wrote, the nation "walked on tip toe."75
organized by discipline allows scholars who are independent to collectively reach
the truth. Ronald Dworkin, We Need a New Definition of Academic Freedom, in
THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 181, 187 (Louis Menand, ed. 1996).
71. Louis Menand, The Limits of Academic Freedom, in THE FUTURE OF ACA-
DEMIC FREEDOM 3, 4 (Louis Menand, ed. 1996).
72. See generally WALTER P. METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF
THE UNIvERSITY (1995); Byrne, supra note 36; Dworkin, supra note 70; Julius G.
Getman & Jacqueline W. Mintz, Forward: Academic Freedom in a Changing
World, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1247 (1988).
73. See Byrne, supra note 36, at 264.
74. See Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding that a
school could fail to renew non-tenured faculty because of displeasure with pedagog-
ical attitude and teaching methods); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir.
1973) (holding that a university teacher has no first amendment right to disregard
curriculum content); Byrne, supra note 36, at 301-02 (noting that administrators
may exercise extensive control over curricular judgments so long as they do not
penalize a professor solely for his political viewpoint).
75. The Last Word on Winchell, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 1995 at 71, 77-78,
quoted in Irving Louis Horowitz, Culture, Politics and McCarthyism: A Retrospec-
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Professor Neil W. Hamilton has demonstrated that external
threats to academic freedom are episodic, usually concurrent
with external crises in society.76 Today, the primary threat to
academic freedom comes from within, from fellow faculty mem-
bers and students. The simplistic phrase usually used to de-
scribe this development is "political correctness," though the
problem is somewhat more complicated. Incidents have oc-
curred widely and have affected faculty and students. As the
jazz critic and journalist Nat Hentoff has written, ". . . censor-
ship of opposing views is one of the strongest drives in human
nature. Throughout history one group or another has been la-
beled too dangerous to be heard."77 Most people do not like a
diversity of viewpoints. They want to ensure their own view is
the dominant one. When it comes to intellectual freedom one
should fear majoritarian rule. Academic freedom protects the
individual from the views of the mass.
An additional internal threat to academic freedom has been
a paradigmatic shift leading to significant intellectual and
methodological transformations in the ways in which scholars
think about knowledge, language, truth and politics-changes
that have altered assumptions and approaches to teaching,
writing, and education itself.78 The first example usually of-
fered is the Kosovo of academe, any meeting of the Modern Lan-
guage Association. One sees this shift in legal education too.7 9
At one time everyone stood pretty much on the same method-
ological ground. That is no longer so, as new approaches toward
tive from the Trenches, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 357, 358 (1996); cf. ELLEN W.
SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES (1986).
76. See generally NEIL W. HAMILTON, ZEALOTRY & ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A LE-
GAL & HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1995).
77. NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME - BUT NOT FOR THEE: How THE
AMERICAN LEFT AND RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH OTHER 5, 7 (1992) quoted
in Neil W. Hamilton, Foreword: Symposium on Zealotry and Academic Freedom,
22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 333 (1996).
78. See Linda Ray Pratt, Foreword, THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, at
viii.
79. Twenty years ago when the author entered legal education, the then dean
of the law school advised him: "Write three law review articles on traditional sub-
jects, and then you can do what you want." He meant two things. The first was
that the independence that academic freedom affords only kicks in after one has
received tenure. The second was that there was a standard methodological ap-
proach within legal education to a law review article, i.e., there was but one way to
write them if one wanted more than a six year career.
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the meaning of reality, truth, and methods of research have
emerged: the law and economics movement, critical legal the-
ory, critical race theory, feminist theory, communitarianism,
and so on. In evaluating approaches to teaching, faculty and
others are debating whether courses should be analytical,
skills-oriented, clinical, simulated, or remedial. One could say
today, that not only are people standing on different method-
ological grounds, that academics are attempting to dig tunnels
under one another. Only academic freedom permits these is-
sues to be debated and worked out in terms of effectiveness,
success, and general acceptance. Only providing security of em-
ployment can protect a full and free discussion. This develop-
ment of different weltanschauung to teaching and research,
means that academic freedom and tenure may be the only
means through which disputatious and difficult people can con-
tinue to coexist and espouse unpopular causes or new
approaches.80
Perhaps because of the nature of work that academics do,
and the security tenure provides, higher education tends to
have more than its share of nonconformists and abrasive per-
sonalities. The boxer Mike Tyson would fit in well on many fac-
ulties.81 For whatever reason, and such theories are best left to
the realm of psychology, one's academic colleagues can be diffi-
cult, and the opportunity to get rid of some of them is irresisti-
ble. Thus, tenure is needed as much for protection from within
as without.
B. Tenure as a Social Contract
Election to tenure represents virtual lifetime membership
in a community. As a member of an academic commonwealth,
one is bound with fellow citizens whom the faculty member ad-
mires, loathes, or fears, but who are linked within a joint enter-
prise. Academic tenure encourages commitment, discipline,
collegiality and compassion to the institution, and despite what
was implied above, to one's colleagues as well. Tenure contrib-
utes to institutional stability by creating a permanent group of
academic citizens without the distraction of ongoing reviews
80. Cf RosovsKy, supra note 50, at 180.
81. Most law school deans would affirm that some faculty member, weekly,
wants to chew his ear.
2000] 179
21
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:159
which might be destructive to collegiality and commitment.8 2
The tenured faculty has been described as a club of eminently
un-clubbable people in the English sense. As with the outside
polity, there are rights and obligations of citizenship. Tenure
has been characterized as a social contract,8 3 and it is through
that compact that the faculty develops internal norms of behav-
ior and expectations. The institutional allegiance creates a re-
lationship that extends far beyond the normal employer-
employee connection. In NLRB v. Yeshiva,8 4 the United States
Supreme Court recognized the special nature of the employ-
ment relationship and the faculty's role in university govern-
ance. Faculty are managers because of their absolute authority
in academic matters.8 5 The absence of tenure would ultimately
diminish faculty powers of governance, and lead to a more
traditional employer-employee relationship.8 6
To be effective, a university must be a community to which
people belong and about which they care.87 Academic disputes
are notorious, but sometimes forgotten are the collegiality and
82. See RosovsKY, supra note 50, at 182; Morris, supra note 4, at 86.
83. See RosovsKy, supra note 50, at 183.
84. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
85. See id. at 686.
The controlling consideration in this case is that the faculty of Yeshiva Uni-
versity exercise authority which in any other context unquestionably would
be managerial. Their authority in academic matters is absolute. They de-
cide what courses will be offered, when they will be scheduled, and to whom
they will be taught. They debate and determine teaching methods, grading
policies, and matriculation standards. They effectively decide which stu-
dents will be admitted, retained, and charged, and the location of a school.
When one considers the function of a university, it is difficult to imagine
decisions more managerial than these. To the extent the industrial analogy
applies, the faculty determines within each school the product to be pro-
duced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the customers who will
be served.
Id. Cf. New York University, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (Oct. 31, 2000) (deciding that a
university's teaching assistants, graduate assistants, and research assistants are
employees within the meaning of National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151
(1998)); Boston Medical Center Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (1999) (holding that
residents and fellows employed by Boston Medical College while students are also
employees under National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1998)).
86. See Morrison, supra note 2, at 383 (discussing how a threat to tenure at
the University of Minnesota led to a revitalization of attempts to unionize the
faculty). See also Courtney Leatherman, Union Movement at Private Colleges
Awakens After a 20-Year Slumber, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 21, 2000, at A16.
87. See BOWEN & SCHUSTER, supra note 42, at 236-37.
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compassion that do exist among members of the university com-
munity. Virtually everyone affiliated with the legal profession
has heard, at some time, of Samuel Williston, the great con-
tracts scholar and author of Williston on Contracts. What is not
so well known is that Williston suffered from depression and
endured numerous breakdowns. He was institutionalized for
approximately four years during the course of his teaching ca-
reer. In his autobiography, one of the first to speak forthrightly
of this illness, he poignantly describes the support of his
Harvard Law School colleagues, and his surprise at how they
refused his resignation and welcomed his return after long ab-
sences.88 No doubt, other law school communities have shown
similar compassion to colleagues when sickness or tragedy have
struck. Absent tenure, the bonds of community might be more
slack.
C. Tenure and Economic Efficiency
Most economists who have studied the tenure system have
found it an economically efficient institution.8 9 Colleges and
universities historically have not had the financial resources to
pay faculty at rates competitive with private industry or the
marketplace. In real terms, professorial and public service sal-
aries have risen little in the post-war period, while the incomes
of professionals and business people have shown large gains. 90
One way to overcome the economic inequalities is through non-
salaried benefits such as tenure. 91 Elimination of tenure would
seriously reduce the attractiveness of higher education as a ca-
reer. It may lower the caliber of people drawn to it, actually
88. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE & LAW 142-66 (1941); see also Allen D. Boyer,
Samuel Williston's Struggle with Depression, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1994).
89. See H. Lorne Carmichael, Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?,
96 J. POL. ECON. 453 (1988); Fritz Machlup, In Defense of Tenure, AAUP Bull. 112
(Summer 1964); Michael S. McPherson & Gordon C. Winston, The Economics of
Academic Tenure: A Relational Perspective, J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 163 (1983);
Siow, supra note 15. But see Robert W. McGee & Walter E. Block, Academic Ten-
ure: An Economic Critique, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 545 (1991).
90. See RosovsKY, supra note 50, at 220.
91. See BOWEN & SCHUSTER, supra note 42, at 237. This argument seems to
fail when applied to the humanities where there is an inadequate nonacademic
marketplace to compete for the supply of candidates. The result of the two-decade
oversupply of Ph.D's in the humanities is to drive down wages even more through
the widespread use of non-tenure track part-time workers.
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increase the cost of attracting talent,92 or lead to the strident
unionism that has so changed the nature of public primary and
secondary education.93
Particularly in areas where there are active labor markets,
both within and outside the discipline of education, institutions
would either have to pay salaries comparable to the industry or
hire lower quality people. Absent tenure, it would be difficult to
get the most gifted younger candidates to interrupt their ca-
reers in law, medicine or elsewhere at severe financial disad-
vantage. In a most interesting study of the economics of tenure,
Michael MacPherson and Gordon Winston suggest that an ex-
tended probationary period, followed by a lifetime guarantee of
a properly defined job, is a well adapted response to the unique
features of academic work. Those features include the difficulty
of monitoring faculty work performance, the highly specialized
nature of academic work and the long, expensive training such
work requires.94
The tenure decision should be a source of internal disci-
pline, for the consequences of making a mistake will be with the
department or school for years. 95 After the initial tenure deci-
sion, following the long six year probationary period, there is no
need for detailed subsequent reviews. These reviews are inher-
ently subjective, institutionally destabilizing, costly, time-con-
suming and difficult to administer because of the highly
specialized and diverse intellectual tasks faculty perform. 96
D. The Importance of Job Security to Scholarly Research
The job security tenure provides is what really gets in the
craw of many critics. Without it, however, much experiment,
scholarship and intellectual risk would not be undertaken. Job
security not only allows the faculty member to pursue the con-
troversial, but also to investigate matters that present a high
probability of failure, including those particular to the sciences,
92. See id. at 239-40.
93. See Boston Medical Center Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (1999); New York
University, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (Oct. 31, 2000); Courtney Leatherman, As
Teaching Assistants Push to Unionize, Debate Grows Over What They Would Gain,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 3, 1997 at A12.
94. See MacPherson & Winston, supra note 89, at 182-83.
95. See RosovsKy, supra note 50, at 181.
96. See id. at 182.
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where failure can occur after years and even decades of re-
search. Tenure allows someone to take that risk and fail with-
out negative employment consequences. As with the federal
judiciary, job security permits the exercise of independent judg-
ment without fear of repercussions. One cannot forget that this
security comes after a long six year probationary period. While
it is true that this may be too short for some late bloomers, if
the pre-tenure review process works as it should, the never-
bloomers will be weeded out.9 7
E. Tenure as a Benefit to Society
Undoubtedly tenure is of benefit to the individual faculty
member. It is also of advantage to the university. Ultimately,
the most important test of tenure is whether it is a benefit to
society. This advantage, the crucial one, rests in the intellec-
tual products of academic freedom.98
One of the most important roles of the university is the en-
couragement of research and scholarship that would not other-
wise take place in business or industry.9 9 This includes the
production of scientific and technical discoveries that cannot be
appropriated and knowledge that would not be of advantage or
of interest to the private sector. This includes much of the re-
search unique to the humanities, pure mathematics, public pol-
icy, and even, alas, law.100 Tenure creates an atmosphere that
promotes the advancement of knowledge into areas where there
are minimal revenue possibilities, and with little encourage-
97. The up-or-out approach of the tenure system is not unique. Until recently
law firms were organized on that principle, see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The Economics of Associate
Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 571-81 (1988), as are some minor league
sports teams that release competent players who will not be promoted to the major
leagues. See Siow, supra note 15, at 157. The film BULL DURHAM (1988) deals with
this situation.
98. See Machlup, supra note 89, at 119. The 1940 Statement of Principles
also recognized that tenure's primary purpose was to benefit society: institutions of
higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the inter-
est of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good
depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition. See 1940 Statement,
supra note 6.
99. See Carmichael, supra note 89, at 455.
100. See id. See also Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law
Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U.L. REV. 615, 648 (1996); Judith S. Kaye,
One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1989).
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ment internally from universities or externally from the
marketplace.10
Of major importance, the tenure system encourages the
scholar and teacher's search for truth. It enables the scientist,
without fear of consequences, to come forward with information
that a drug promoted by a company that heavily sponsors re-
search at her university, is unsafe or ineffective. 10 2 It permits
the teacher or scholar to be uninhibited in criticizing accepted
theories, widely held beliefs, or existing social, political and eco-
nomic institutions. It encourages individuals to embark, or con-
tinue upon, new lines of reasoning, which may eventually lead
to new insights, understanding or knowledge regarding nature
or society. 10 3 Tenure and academic freedom allow faculty mem-
bers to revise and experiment in their teaching methodologies,
to better train their students for important roles in society. 10 4
Academic tenure protects the decentralized community of
checkers, who determine what, for the present, is to be consid-
ered knowledge, what is error, and what is mere belief.
Whether knowledge is proven by the scientific method, or as in
the humanities and social sciences, to be reviewed by those
deemed competent in a discipline, the disinterested judgment
provided by academic freedom is one of the major benefits to
society of the tenure system. 105 The primary benefit to all of us
101. One never knows when a discovery or insight will prove valuable. The
absence of market incentives allows research that can stand on hold until knowl-
edge, science or society can put it to use. The university serves as such a reservoir
of knowledge. Even advances that can be put to practical use in a few years may
not be recognized immediately. It took Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, 1997
Nobel Prize winners in economics, who (along with Fisher Black) discovered the
formula for pricing options and derivative instruments, three years to get their
work published. Peter Passell, 2 Get Nobel for a Formula at the Heart of Options
Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1997, at D2.
102. See Philip J. Hilts, Company Tried to Block Report That Its H.I.V. Vac-
cine Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at A26. (California company sued university
and researchers to block publication of scientific papers and seeks damages of $7
million).
103. See Machlup, supra note 89, at 120, 123-24.
104. See MORRIS, supra note 4, at 8.
105. See Hamilton, supra note 53, at 15-16; see also Byrne, supra note 36, at
269-88.
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is that the academic tenure system creates a means whereby
society may have the benefit of honest judgments. 10 6
III. MAKING TENURE MORE EFFECTIVE
A. The Pre-Tenure Process
To say that tenure is a net benefit to society does not mean
one should break into cheers. After all, one could reach the
same conclusion about the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, Internal Revenue Service or the State Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles. If tenure is to survive, it must become more
flexible than it has been in the past.
The prescriptions for making the tenure system more effec-
tive are so obvious and commonsensical that one hesitates to
express them. At the onset, the pre-tenure procedures and ex-
pectations must be understood by the candidate, faculty, de-
partment chair and dean. The process must be applied in
similar fashion to each individual. Consistency in process is
paramount. This does not mean that the substantive standards
must remain the same. There are decisions which hold that the
standards applied to tenure candidates can change between the
time the person entered upon the tenure trail, to the decision
point, but the procedures must remain consistent for each can-
didate. 10 7 As a university improves its reputation, tenure stan-
dards tighten. Economics also play a part. It is ironic that
tenure is most difficult to attain at the most elite universities,
which are generally the most affluent, and easiest to obtain at
106. See CLARK BYSE & Louis JOUGHLIN, TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDU-
CATION 4 (1959).
107. See Wells v. Doland, 711 F.2d 670, 675 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
university could deny tenure to an assistant professor because of a desire to up-
grade the department with a new requirement of doctorate); Hooker v. Tufts Uni-
versity, 581 F. Supp. 104, 114-16 (D. Mass. 1983) (holding that a change in the
policy waiving scholarship requirements in considering tenure for athletic coaches,
which thereby held candidates to criteria in Faculty Handbook, did not implicate
sex discrimination); Lewandoski v. Vt. State Colleges, 457 A.2d 1384, 1388-90 (Vt.
1983) (holding that a substantial tightening of criteria for tenure, making substi-
tutes for Ph.D. degree the exception rather than the rule, within the discretion of
president in interpretation of tenure criteria was not arbitrary or abuse of discre-
tion); Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 640-45 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that the fail-
ure of a school to apply the same standards in evaluating qualifications as were
used "in the past" in passing on promotions of faculty members, was not a constitu-
tional violation of due process and equal protection).
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the less research-oriented institutions and community
colleges108
The tenure decision should be divided into procedural and
substantive components. Peer review, the substantive prong, is
the primary duty of the faculty. One should not underestimate
the importance of student input. It is the formal responsibility
of the administration to ensure consistent and fair procedures
in the consideration of candidates. They will bear the costs of
litigation when the process is flawed. It is, however, the moral
responsibility of the tenured faculty to ensure such procedures.
University counsel should meet with department chairs annu-
ally to ensure that the process is consistent, clear, and fair. If
candidates have weaknesses, they should be counseled with
candor and notified before they come up for tenure considera-
tion. There should be a lawyerly approach, including keeping
detailed written records of such communication. 10 9 The essence
of the tenure decision is peer review, but the university should
occasionally insert itself at the substantive level. This observer
concludes that faculty are often reluctant to vote "no," and de-
partment chairs support the faculty decision even when they
know better. In the end, the administration is guardian of the
gate. They must make hard decisions in good faith, which may
go against majority rule, or return a recommendation to the ap-
propriate committees demanding a further burden of proof be
met.110
The administrative focus should be less on quality of teach-
ing or effectiveness in the classroom, of which student input and
peer reviews will create an adequate record, and more on
whether the individual adequately exceeds the standard. Is
this person likely to contribute and to grow? That should be the
bottom line. This administrative review should not be utilized
frequently, rather it is like the emergency cord on a subway car
or train, to be exercised with great care and discretion.
108. Thus, in the School of Arts and Sciences at Harvard, only 60% of tenure
track faculty will receive tenure. See RosovsKv, supra note 50, at 190. In law
schools, perhaps because of the ease of moving to more lucrative private practice,
tenure track success is greater and the time period for review usually shorter. In
secondary education, tenure, a subject of union contract, comes after a few years.
109. See Franke, supra note 59.
110. See generally Sara Rimer, Tenure Denial to a Woman Puts Harvard in an
Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1997, at A12.
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The proper approach toward the tenure decision should be
when in doubt, don't. If one looks at such decisions as a two or
three million dollar commitment over thirty to fifty years, one's
level of scrutiny and concern increases. The probationary pe-
riod is not a marathon, where a finisher, or in this context, one
who completes the requirements, throws himself across the fin-
ish line with an expectation of reward. Rather, it should be like
a satellite tournament, offering the best estimate of one's future
professional growth and development.
B. After the Unfavorable Decision
We live in a litigious society, and unfavorable tenure deci-
sions are more likely than not to wind up in court. The hook by
which one may obtain a serious consideration of a claim of im-
proper treatment, is to allege some impermissible form of dis-
crimination. In the law school context, litigation is probably
therapeutic for the disappointed candidate. After all, if a disap-
pointed law faculty member does not sue, who would? A law-
suit also saves face until one moves on with his or her life. If
the process of tenure consideration is consistent and fair, the
university should defend its decision to the end. These litiga-
tions are expensive. They go on for years. Publicity can be ter-
rible. Human Rights Commissions appropriately are
responsive to allegations of discrimination. Yet, if the univer-
sity is in the right, it should not settle.
C. Dealing with Deadwood
One of the most unfortunate images of the academic profes-
sion is the ad hominem "deadwood," defined in the dictionary as
anything useless and burdensome.11' If that definition of dead-
wood is correct in the higher education context, such a faculty
member could, and should, be terminated for cause. Speaking
more precisely, "deadwood" refers to an underperforming
faculty member who has not attained the promise demonstrated
when considered for tenure.
Clearly, an unproductive faculty member is a cost to stu-
dents, the university, and society. Yet, it is very difficult to as-
certain how great of a problem this really is. Though we live in
111. RANDOM HousE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 512 (2d ed. 1993).
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a quantitative age, there is no deadwood index. Where is US
News when you need them? "The Top Twenty Deadwood Facul-
ties." The author has found two non-scientific estimates.
Henry Rosovsky, in his delightful book, The University: An
Owner's Manual, states that the label "deadwood" would apply
to under two percent of a major university's faculty. 112 Ralph
Brown and Jordan Kurland proffer a "guess" of five percent at
colleges and universities that make less demanding require-
ments for tenure. 113 They also ask about the deadwood index
for comparable sectors of the workforce. Is there de facto ten-
ure, and is the deterrent to society, from the existence of un-
pruned deadwood, more or less severe than the harm caused by
the indolent of academia?" 4 This observer wonders whether
there may even be university administrative personnel who
might be saddled with the deadwood epithet. The higher up one
goes on the administrative ladder, the less one sees the kind of
rigorous review and turn-over that critics of tenure would wish
for underperforming faculty.
A wounding and common criticism of tenure is that it fos-
ters mediocrity which leads to deadwood. This argument really
divides into two prongs. One is that the petrified forest will
grow as tenured mediocrities perpetuate bad teaching and little
scholarship. The second prong is that the system of academic
tenure turns previously energetic, gifted and promising faculty
into deadwood, because they lose interest in the hard, frustrat-
ing, and often tedious and time-consuming work that teaching
and scholarship entail. 1 5 The first argument goes to the prac-
tice of selection, and the care and rigor in which the tenure deci-
112. See RosovsKy, supra note 50, at 210-11.
113. Brown & Kurland, supra note 7, at 332.
114. See id. One might argue that unpruned deadwood frequently exists in
the higher levels of business. Unless the corporation is in severe financial exigency
or has a particularly independent board of directors, most managements that mud-
dle along and whose corporations underperform for years will not be replaced. A
recent example is that of Robert Allen of AT&T whose nine year reign led to bil-
lions of dollars in losses in a misguided computer investment, a split of the com-
pany into three, stripping the corporation of some of its greatest assets and
management talent, and being bypassed by the telecommunications revolution.
See John J. Keller, Outside In, How AT&T's Directors Decided It Was Time for
Change at the Top, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1997, at Al.
115. This argument is offered and answered in Machlup, supra note 89, at
116-17.
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sion is made. It is rare, though it does happen, that faculty will
bloom after the probationary period. It is better to lose the occa-
sional late bloomer than take a chance and be burdened with a
never-bloomer. There really are not that many surprises. The
fault of average candidates continuing their mediocrity lies with
those responsible for the tenuring process.
The second prong of the criticism is harder to answer. Un-
deniably, some faculty fool you after the fact. 116 They turn lazy
and satisfied. They never reach their potential and disappoint
their colleagues, and undoubtedly themselves. Here the tenure
system fails. Would another system energize these people? The
insecurity engendered by non-tenure systems probably would
vitalize some, but others burn out, have personal crises or
change their goals. These have little to do with the tenure sys-
tem, but one must admit the enervation of energy and potential
is a consequence of it. It seems the appropriate response to the
second criticism is to create an atmosphere of post-tenure aspi-
rations and expectations.
Assuming that to some extent the academic tenure system
is a dead weight, a burden on the university and society, the
question arises whether the cost of a more efficient, productive
system is worth what would be lost. If the tenure system offers
a higher form of social and economic organization, imposes less
stress on the individual, and produces a net gain to society
through the advancement of knowledge, should it be emended
because of its inefficiencies? 1 7 In fact, recent studies of down-
116. In discussing this subject with a colleague who recently retired from a
major "Wall Street" law firm, he pointed out that the most frustrating aspect of
electing a person to partnership was that their personalities seemed to change.
The author suggested that it was less a personality change than the emergence of
their real persona. Any probationary employee in any field who demonstrates a
difficult personality should be denied partnership or tenure or whatever on
grounds of stupidity. To get along while untenured, one should go along.
117. In recent years there has been a transformation in the ambiance and
economic structure of many law firms from a system where partnership was a life-
time commitment on both sides to a mere business where non-productive partners
are expelled from the firm. Perhaps the author knows few of the affluent winners
under this system, but he has never met an attorney who believes that this ap-
proach is a professional advance or improvement in the nature of work. The com-
pensation approach of some law firms, "you eat what you kill," i.e., remuneration is
directly related to the business and profits one generates, offers a poor analogy to
education. In the absence of pressing financial exigency or the transformation of a
profession into a business, there are other sectors with quasi-tenure systems.
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sizing corporations have shown that they suffered loss of mo-
rale, ongoing insecurity, lack of loyalty, and lack of trust by the
workforce, long after the cuts had ended.11 Insecurity does not
increase productivity, and in a labor intensive environment,
where relationships among faculty and with students are criti-
cal, it would not.
Deadwood creates an economic and image cost on higher
education." 9 The best way to avoid the deadwood problem is to
have a fair but rigorous pre-tenure scrutiny. Many law schools
engage in a substantial amount of hand-wringing over faculty
perceived to be underperforming, albeit rarely to their face.
One alternative to the deadwood problem is to ignore the of-
fenders, or in the business analogy, write the disappointment
off and move on. 120 Another is to introduce a system of person-
nel management that will keep expectations high and develop a
reward system.
D. Post-Tenure Review
One of the more consistent refrains from the administrative
side of the debate has been for "post-tenure review," a phrase
that has the ambiguity and generality of such flexible legal con-
118. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Manager's Journal: Show Humanity When
You Show Employees the Door, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1997, at A22 (describing how
inside downsized companies cynicism and mistrust remain); see also Adam Bryant,
Market Place: What Price Efficiency? Focus on Costs May Have Blurred Delta's Vi-
sion, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1997, at D1.
119. The economic costs of nonproductive senior faculty are uncertain, but
may be less than one intuits. Michael R. Ransom has asserted that "nation-wide
data from large research-oriented universities show a negative relationship be-
tween seniority and salary of professors. . ." Michael R. Ranson, Seniority and
Monopsony in the Academic Labor Market, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 221, 232 (1993).
120. Another law school with which the author is familiar gentrified over the
past fifteen years from a basically bar-review, trade-focused, evening-oriented law
school to one now considered a leading regional institution. Many faculty from the
old regime basically taught as an adjunct to their law practices. Given the new
mission of the school, these faculty members were not an asset. What did the
school do? It ignored them. The school did what businesses do when a product or
strategy fails. It wrote them off. Though there were not the tax benefits of write-
offs one receives in a for-profit business, the approach was similar. These individ-
uals taught their courses, but for all practical purposes were treated as well-paid
adjuncts. They had no influence, and received none of the non-salary prerequi-
sites. They had become nonpersons as the school moved on and looked to cement-
ing a new reputation.
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cepts as "good faith,"121 "fiduciary obligation," 122 or "reasonable
expectations." 23 Post-tenure review is a system of periodic
evaluation that goes beyond traditional forms of monitoring uti-
lized in most colleges and universities. It may include annual
reports for purposes of determining salary and promotion, for-
malized reviews for awarding grants and sabbaticals and re-
view of teaching or service. 24 Those who are critical of tenure
often use the term in the sense of another chance to get rid of
underperforming faculty. 25 The studies never seem to focus
upon the impact of such reviews on the morale of the particular
department or school, or whether intra-departmental or school
politics create a tension that filters down to the student body. 26
There are other reasons to doubt the efficacy of the "capital
punishment" approach. Assume a tenured faculty of fifty, and a
121. Because the doctrine of good faith must be applied to the entire range of
contracts, definitions of good faith tend to be either too abstract or applicable only
to specific contexts. See, e.g., Best v. U.S. Nat'l. Bank, 739 P.2d 554, 557 (Or.
1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (2000); Robert Summers,
"Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 199-207 (1968); Steven J. Burton, Breach of
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV.
369, 390-94 (1980).
122. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION, AGENCY & PARTNER-
SHIP: DUTIES IN ONGOING BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 2 (1991). "Fiduciary obligation is
also notably elusive as a concept; the particular duties it imposes vary in different
contexts, as does the justification for imposing the obligation itself." Id.
123. The scope of reasonable expectations, for example, within the context of
close corporations is explained in a leading treatise: "The breadth of the reasona-
ble-expectations standard is that, within the close corporation, participation in
management - and certainly the receipt of a salary are the rewards shareholders
customarily seek when investing in a close corporation." JAMES D. Cox, THOMAS
LEE HAZEN & F. HODGE O'NEAL, CORPORATIONS § 14.12 at 385 (1997). See also
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983); Robert Hillman, The
Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture, A Consideration of the
Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1,
77-81 (1983) (arguing that expectations should be a part of an understanding, ex-
plicit or implicit, between the participants in the corporation).
124. See AAUP, Post-Tenure Review: An AAUP Response, Academe Today;
Document Archive, June 15, 1998, available at http://aaup.org/postten.htm [here-
inafter Post-Tenure Review].
125. In fairness, these plans are usually portrayed as the faculty develop-
ment. See Brown & Kurland, supra note 7, at 342.
126. Many in legal education are familiar with the guerilla warfare at
Harvard Law School. Though ideology was a major part of the Harvard conflict,
unless handled carefully, post-tenure review can create more problems than it
solves. See e.g. ELEANOR KERLOW, POISONED Ivy: How EGOS, IDEOLOGY, AND
POWER POLITICS ALMOST RUINED HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1994).
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renewal review every six years with the decision for the sev-
enth. This evaluation could not be done by administrators with-
out gutting the idea of peer review. The amount of faculty time
needed to fairly and adequately review their tenured colleagues
would be enormous. That time could better be used in further-
ance of teaching, scholarship, or service to the community.
Would faculty willingly spend the additional time to review
their tenured colleagues and friends? Would this be an efficient
use of resources? Would it cause more tumult and stress than
benefits gained? Would there be success in removing tenured
faculty, and if so, at what litigious cost and disruption to the
school? 127
A few institutions have implemented systematic post-ten-
ure review. In 1983 the University of Colorado instituted such
a system, and a study of its effect was undertaken and pub-
lished in 1989 and supported the conclusion, "that the benefits
to be gained from such review are modest or speculative while
the costs, principally consumption of time are substantial and
demonstrable.' 128  Harold Shapiro, currently president of
Princeton University, while endorsing periodic evaluation of
tenured faculty as simply good personnel policy, has suggested
that:
We should disconnect such ongoing periodic evaluations from
the question of tenure itself. Any attempt to link the issue of ten-
ure and periodic evaluation of tenured faculty, no matter how
well-meaning, is, in my judgment, unlikely to strengthen our in-
stitutions .... To the extent that the present tenure system serves
society well, it does so independent of periodic evaluation. To the
extent that the present system does not serve society well, a sys-
tem of periodic post-tenure evaluation linked to tenure itself will
not rectify the situation.129
127. See Robert B. Conrad & Louis A. Trosch, Renewable Tenure, 27 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 551 (1998). "The long-term effect of replacing tenure with renewable tenure
or other employment control structures could be disastrous not only to academic
freedom but to the overall good of higher education." Id. at 571.
128. Report of Committee A, 76 Academe 32, 38 (Sept.-Oct. 1990), cited in
Brown & Kurland, supra note 7, at 342 n.105. For a review of more recent efforts
see Ira P. Robbins, Exploring the Concept of Post-Tenure Review in Law Schools, 9
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 387 (1998).
129. Quoted in Brown & Kurland, supra note 7, at 343.
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The concept of post-tenure review is enormously broad, and
to some degree exists everywhere. Basically, as Dr. Shapiro
notes, it is good personnel policy. 130 Even at a public university
where salaries are open to public scrutiny and proceed in lock-
step, a department chair or dean makes decisions on courses
taught, time of scheduling, research assistance, sabbaticals,
travel allotments and other discretionary items. Decisions on
these matters can be a form of post-tenure review.
In June 1998, recognizing that many institutions have
adopted post-tenure reviews and some state legislatures have
made such reviews mandatory in public institutions, the AAUP
endorsed a statement: "Post-tenure Review: An AAUP Re-
sponse" which created guidelines for a review process, but
stopped far short of its use as a method to revalidate or revoke
tenured status.131 The AAUP statement states that post-tenure
review should not be aimed at accountability but at faculty de-
velopment. 132 It must be developed and carried out by the
faculty, should not be used to shift the burden of proof from an
institution's burden of proof to show cause for dismissal, and
the review must be conducted according to standards that pro-
tect academic freedom. 133
It is often said that law school deans are to faculty as hy-
drants are to dogs. When it comes to concepts such as post-ten-
ure review, a dean should be more than a four letter word. The
dean, as well as department chairs, mediate between adminis-
tration and faculty and are of two worlds. They, rather than
faculty, can serve as the most useful evaluators of tenured
faculty. At some schools faculty submit a memorandum toward
the end of the academic year of their activities in the course of
the year and thereafter meet with the dean. The dean should
award salary increments after an evaluation. This process
should be formalized, and the dean or department chair should
speak forthrightly to the faculty member about weaknesses, ei-
130. For a suggestion of periodic evaluation of tenured faculty by peers that
review ongoing productivity to provide feedback rather than discipline, see
Michael I. Swygert & Nathaniel Gozansky, The Desirability of Post-Tenure, Per-
formance Reviews of Law Professors, 15 STETSON L. REV. 355 (1986).
131. See Courtney Leatherman, AAUP Offers Guidance on Post-Tenure Re-
views, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 26, 1998, at A13.
132. See Post-Tenure Review, supra note 124.
133. Id.
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ther in the classroom or in the lack of scholarship. There should
be goals established, and they should be reviewed in the subse-
quent year. A record should be kept of such aspirations and
whether they are achieved. Salary increments and other emol-
uments and privileges should reflect attainment of one's goals.
Most people wish to do well. This informal, though regular-
ized, approach will be the most efficient in terms of human re-
sources, and will provide a meaningful reward system. Except
for the dean or department chair, it will be less threatening and
stressful than other approaches. 34 A full scale post-tenure re-
view should be undertaken when evidence exists to warrant it.
For example, a professor's review for salary purposes may indi-
cate his or her performance is inadequate. 135
E. Long-Term Employment Contracts
Most frequently offered as an alternative to traditional ten-
ure, are long-term or rolling contracts, sometimes referred to as
"term tenure." The faculty member is initially appointed for
one to three years, with terms of reappointment eventually ex-
tended to seven or, as at Hampshire College in Massachusetts,
ten years.136 Each contract renewal is contingent on the faculty
member's performance in the preceding period. Long-term con-
tracts are in effect at some community colleges and a few four
year institutions, often of the granola-crunching or experimen-
tal variety. The proffered advantages of long-term renewable
appointments are that the potential of non-reappointment pro-
vides an incentive to good performance, and will eliminate
deadwood. They permit institutional flexibility in planning,
budgeting and program development, and enable the college to
terminate those who do not respond to current needs, and reap-
point those that do.' 37 For trustees, and some administrators,
long-term contracts, as well as the kind of post-tenure review
which leads to dismissal, 138 offer a superficial attractiveness.
134. At some cost of stress to the Dean or department chair.
135. See Myles Brand, Why Tenure is Indispensable, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Apr. 2, 1999 at A64.
136. See MacPherson & Winston, supra note 89, at 187.
137. See FACULTY TENURE, supra note 40, at 11-13.
138. See id. at 39-40.
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Empirically, data show that term contracts are renewed at
an overwhelming rate.139 Turnover is quite low. 140 Dismissals
raise the same issues and ruckus as tenure denials, or post-ten-
ure dismissal for cause.14' It should not surprise that most con-
tracts are renewed perfunctorily. If the renewal decision was
other than nominal, the resources required to adequately moni-
tor faculty performance would be extremely costly to universi-
ties committed to it. Without substantial dismissals, the
monitoring effort may be wasted. If the institution is competing
in the employment market with others that do have a tenure
system, it will be difficult to hire the best available candidates
at the same wages as places with greater job security. 142
Routine reappointments make term contracts resemble the
institution of tenure. In fact, the term contract approach, in the
words of a president of an institution with such a system, is re-
ally instant tenure. 143 One of the differences in term appoint-
ments from a tenure decision is there is no moment of truth, no
time when the faculty must make an up-or-out decision, no time
when the monitoring resources of the university must be exer-
cised to make a decision with thirty or more years of conse-
quences. As the opportunity for evaluation will come along
again, one can always make the argument of "one more chance."
With the tenure decision, there is but one opportunity, and the
department must live with the consequences. 1 By forcing the
institution at a definite time to determine whether one should
remain or go, the tenure system helps institutions avoid contin-
uing on their faculties those who are agreeable, but not out-
139. See, e.g., Debbie Goldberg, Career Options, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997, at
R6 (stating that at Hampshire College, which does not have traditional academic
tenure, 83% of Hampshire's 90 or so faculty have ten year contracts).
140. See RICHARD P. CHAIT & ANDREW T. FORD, BEYOND TRADITIONAL TENURE
42-47 (1982).
141. For examples of controversial contract terminations see Mark Muro, A
Teacher Disillusioned with Utopia; Jeff Wallen Fights Dismissal from Hampshire
College, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 1990, at 97 and Courtney Leatherman, A Campus
Without Tenure is Dubbed 'Fire at Will U.', CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 15, 1997,
at A12. See Robin Wilson, A Trustee's Criticism of Faculty Members Throws Ben-
nington Into a New Period of Turmoil, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., March 31, 2000, at
A17.
142. See MacPherson & Winston, supra note 89, at 180.
143. See CHAITE & FORD, supra note 140, at 29.
144. See McPherson & Winston, supra note 89, at 180; Machlup, supra note
89, at 115; Carmichael, supra note 89, at 469 n.7.
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standing, and renewing term appointments out of generosity,
friendship, or neglect. 145
A second, even more formidable problem with term con-
tracts, is that those who are judged will soon be judges. In
traditional academic tenure decisions why do non-tenured
faculty not vote when making the judgment? They know the
candidate better than most senior faculty, and are probably
more au courant with the candidate's scholarship and its qual-
ity. The reasons are twofold: the inevitable conflict of interest
and the high probability of collusion.146 These pressures would
be even greater under term contracts, as senior faculty with
high salaries and uncertain opportunities for lateral movement
are faced with the reappointment decision.
It is likely that because of the enormous resources needed
to monitor reappointments, the university will become more in-
volved in the review process. This will create a more hierarchi-
cal system of control, which differs from the professional self-
regulation and peer control that now exists. It will create a
more adversarial position among the faculty, the administra-
tion and the institution. 147
Long-term contracts do little to protect academic free-
dom.148 Take the example of the law professor at the University
of Texas who uttered offensive extramural remarks. There
were calls from legislators and the public to fire him. Com-
plaints of harassment were filed. The professor was protected
as any public employee would be,149 but what if he was at a pri-
vate institution? The pressures of boards of trustees who ulti-
mately approve all appointments, not to speak of budgets,
might prevail over the best intentioned efforts of an administra-
tion. With a controversial candidate the principle of peer re-
view would inevitably be diminished by outside pressures, and
the faculty's role in governance would decline.
145. See FACULTY TENURE, supra note 40, at 16.
146. See McPherson & Winston, supra note 89, at 178.
147. See Bess, supra note 47, at 12-15.
148. See Brown & Kurland, supra note 7, at 342.
149. See Pickering v. Bd. Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968); Hall v. Kutztown
Univ., No. 96-4516, 1998 WL 10233 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1998) (holding that the de-
fendant state university's failure to hire plaintiff as tenure track faculty member
because of critical comments about multiculturalism made at a faculty meeting
was violation of First Amendment).
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Long-term contracts' greatest deficiency, and the same crit-
icism might be applied to certain forms of post-tenure review, is
the change it would bring to the hiring process, as well as to the
nature of faculty work. Term contracts will have a long term
impact on faculty morale and the academic community. As with
the arrival of locusts, every seven years will bring great anxiety.
If all faculty had to deal with reappointment, there would be
several consequences, not the least of which would be ongoing
anxiety, and the reversal of the old saw that academic politics
are of the most vicious sort, because the stakes are so low. 150
The stakes and viciousness could be at a new peak.
It has been argued that a contract system in place of tenure
will actually reduce faculty motivation. This is because the re-
wards of academic life, the intrinsic satisfaction of one's work,
communication mechanisms that permit peer generated pro-
ductivity and quality norms to be continually salient (scholar-
ship and its rewards), multiple career tracks that lead to high
status and respect (specialization in one's field), the opportunity
on occasion to take risks in new ventures without penalty (a
shift in intellectual direction), and an expectation of trust and
good will by the university will be placed in the background. 15
1
Contract systems must be enforced through bureaucratic
mechanisms involving the administration to a greater extent
than under tenure systems. This is de-motivating. Administra-
tive power will be greater because non-renewal of short-term
contracts is more politically feasible than the cumbersome
mechanisms used to remove a tenured faculty member. Lim-
ited term appointments place the central focus of faculty life on
the rehiring decision rather than traditional norms which re-
quire an atmosphere of freedom. 52
There may be more subtle changes with term tenure and
post-tenure review dismissals as well. Particularly in the sci-
ences and some areas of the humanities, the long-term career
research project would be less likely to be undertaken if it could
not be completed within the period before the next reappoint-
150. See Robin Wilson, A New Campus Without Tenure Considers What It's
Missing: Professors at Florida Gulf Coast University Complain That a Contract
System Offers too Little Security, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 12, 2000, at A18.
151. See Bess, supra note 47, at 3.
152. Id. at 6.
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ment. An optimal hiring system should offer appointments to
individuals of ever increasing quality. One of the most positive
aspects of the academic tenure system is that it encourages de-
partments to hire the best and brightest available candidate,
making decisions that will benefit the institution over time. If
the appointment process and tenure decision are working prop-
erly, new hires will involve younger, more highly skilled indi-
viduals than existing tenured members. As H. Lorne
Carmichael, an economist, has pointed out, without tenure a
university would have some problems getting its incumbents to
identify the best candidates, because they could not rule out the
possibility they will be asked to leave at some time in the future
for some other more qualified candidate. 153 To ensure an inde-
pendent evaluation of the ability of candidates being hired or
evaluated, the evaluation must be independent of the evalu-
ator's opportunities for future retention. 54 If there is a danger
that senior faculty will be fired, incumbents may try to stock the
university with poorer quality faculty to reduce the chances
that when they are up for reconsideration they will be the ones
terminated.155
F. Termination for Cause
Regrettably, there are situations where tenured faculty
should be dismissed for cause. If a rigorous probationary review
of tenure track candidates is conducted, and the post-tenure an-
nual reviews suggested herein are adopted, there should be few
such instances. If educational institutions have the resolve to
remove a faculty member where cause exists, and faculty exer-
cise their responsibilities of peer review, termination will occur
and be supported by the courts. 156
153. See Carmichael, supra note 89, at 463.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 470.
156. In the last seven years the Universities of Texas, Texas A & M, and
Houston have terminated the tenure of eight professors, three for poor perform-
ance. See Wiener, supra note 19, at 62. More common, unfortunately, is the situa-
tion of a University of Wisconsin professor, the director of the Engineering
Research Center, who served three months in jail after pleading guilty to federal
misdemeanor charges for falsifying grant applications. See Julianne Basinger &
Courtney Leatherman, Stanford's Presidential Search Adds to Competition Among
Elite Institutions; Wisconsin Professor Keeps Tenure Despite Jail Term for Lying,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 24, 1999 at A14. The university agreed to allow the
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The complexity of the process is often blamed for the near
impossibility of dismissal. The procedures are time-consuming,
as they should be, given the consequences of the action. The
burden of proof is on the institution throughout the proceed-
ings. Though the AALS standards should be tailored to the in-
dividual institution, the protection they provide should not be
undermined.
One way to shorten the time frame from formal charge to
resolution would be to insert a clause in the standard faculty
contract as well as when tenure is granted that all disputes that
are not resolved at the university level shall be submitted to
binding arbitration. The AAUP recognizes this alternative. 157
Courts generally limit their scrutiny to whether proper proce-
dural due process has been followed. 158 The danger of an arbi-
tration hearing is that the arbitrator could reconsider the
substantive grounds for dismissal. Despite that possibility,
which is probably not that great if the arbitrator is experienced
in higher education, the advantages of arbitration to all parties
in terms of cost and expedition of hearing outweigh the possibil-
ity of overturning peer and administrative review.
A greater problem than administrative hesitancy is the re-
luctance of faculty to "convict," or find justifiable grounds for
termination for cause. Faculty do not easily vote for conviction,
perhaps for the fear of "but for the grace of" go I or "that is the
administration's problem." The governing body of the institu-
tion has the right to review the faculty's decision, and in the
appropriate situation to overturn it. In the last analysis, the
ability to terminate tenured faculty relies as much on the uni-
versity's will to bring a case, and its capability of proving it. If
the faculty are going to respect, enrich and nourish the univer-
sity, they absolutely must exercise professionalism and integ-
rity on this account. Faculty who ignore the wayward colleague
not only betray the university, its ideals, and the student body,
but diminish the professorate. In the current environment of
professor to keep his tenure if he gave up his directorship. See id. The university
struck the deal to avoid going through lengthy due process proceedings. See id.
157. See American Association of University Professors, Arbitration in Cases
of Dismissal, reprinted in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 86, 88 (1995).
158. See Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d 382, 387 (3d Cir. 1975); MORRIS, supra note
4, at 23-26; Brooks, supra note 52, at 335.
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legislative and public hostility to academic tenure, and to insti-
tutions of higher learning, the failure of faculty to act respon-
sibly is inexcusable. However, it is unrealistic to expect the
faculty to be the primary body to police themselves, particularly
with the cost of litigation and the tendencies of human nature.
The initiating burden must be upon the university, but the
faculty should proceed in partnership when the circumstances
so warrant.
There generally have been four situations when tenured
faculty have been dismissed for adequate cause. One ground is
for financial exigency. The AAUP has developed procedures for
this, 159 and there has been litigation on the issue. 160 Three
other grounds of cause for termination are incompetence, illegal
activity, and sexual harassment. The latter may also, but not
always, involve illegal activity. When an activity is illegal or
against university regulations, as in the case of sexual harass-
ment, adequate cause is clearer than a dismissal for incompe-
tence. 16' A problem with standards of incompetence is that in
159. See American Association of University Professors, Recommended Insti-
tutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in AAUP POLICY
DOcUMENTs AND REPORTS 21, 23-24 (1995); American Association of University
Professors, On Institutional Problems Resulting from Financial Exigency: Some
Operating Guidelines, reprinted in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 193,
193 (1995).
160. See Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978); Mabey v. Regan, 537
F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976); Linn v. Andover Newton Theological School, Inc., 874
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989); Scheuer v. Creighton Univ., 260 N.W.2d 595 (Neb. 1977);
Am. Ass'n. of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 322 A.2d 846 (N.J. Super.
1974).
161. See Brooks, supra note 52, at 347. Adequate cause in the latter context
consists of an "unwillingness or inability to contribute to the advancement of truth
and knowledge through effective teaching, research, scholarship and contributions
to the community." Id. "Second, this inability or unwillingness must be exhibited
for a period of time indicating that improvement is unlikely, or be so egregious that
rehabilitation is improbable or impractical" as evidenced by unsuccessful attempts
at counseling and remediation. Id. Third, the findings must be made by the ac-
cused peers, and fourth, each of the factors should be examined in light of the
customs, practices, and understandings of the particular institution and the aca-
demic community as a whole. See id. See also Faculty Tenure Tomorrow, in
FACULTY TENURE, supra note 40 at 75 (".. .'adequate cause' in faculty dismissal
proceedings should be restricted to (a) demonstrated incompetence or dishonesty
in teaching or research, (b) substantial and manifest neglect of duty, and (c) per-
sonal conduct which substantially impairs the individual's fulfillment of his insti-
tutional responsibilities. The burden of proof in establishing cause for dismissal
rests upon the institution"). Id.
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most cases they present a substantial number of subjective ele-
ments. The cases that have affirmed dismissal for teaching in-
competence are usually of the "smoking gun" variety. The
professor did not show up, was tardy, did not give grades, was
ill-prepared and disorganized in presentation. 162 There have
been a few dismissals for insubordination,163 though such be-
havior often seems to be the norm amongst a good number of
law school faculty members, and a few because of poor student
evaluations, though other factors played a part.64 When proce-
dures are followed, the courts generally uphold the university's
decision. 165 At this stage, negotiated settlements are to be wel-
comed as would be determination on the university's part to
proceed against those who are unworthy of membership
amongst the tenured faculty.
IV. CONCLUSION
Academic tenure is a partnership between administrators
and faculty with responsibilities on both sides. The tenure sys-
tem is under a period of sustained attack, not only by the
Visigoths and know-nothings who do not understand its link to
academic freedom or the need for economic security of employ-
ment, but also by others who see only its inflexibility, cost, and
worst-case scenarios that appear in the press. It is also criti-
cized by those who question its viability in today's educational
162. See King v. Univ. of Minnesota, 587 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn. 1984), affd,
774 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1095 (1986).
163. See Stastny v. Bd. Trustees Central Washington, 647 P.2d 496 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1982) (regarding a dismissed professor who failed to return from foreign
lecture in time to start the semester when permission to do so had been denied);
Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1975) (involving poor student and faculty
ratings and unwillingness to cooperate).
164. See Agarwal v. Univ. of Minnesota, 788 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1986); Java v.
Fayetteville State Univ., 426 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.N.C. 1976); see also John D. Cope-
land & John W. Murray, Jr., Getting Tossed from the Ivy Tower: The Legal Impli-
cations of Evaluating Faculty Performance, 61 Mo. L. REV. 233 (1996); MORRIS,
supra note 4, at 62-80.
165. See MORRIS supra note 4, at 30. Courts give substantial deference to sub-
stantive decisions of academic administrators and governing boards so long as
they follow sound procedures. See id. This is particularly so when the issue is
competence and responsibility in teaching and research. See id. Cf. Berkowitz v.
President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2001 WL 13239 (Mass. Super., Jan. 4,
2001). Plaintiffs allegation of the failure to follow institution's own tenure proce-
dures survives motion to dismiss. See id. at 1.
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marketplace. There are some very real problems with academic
tenure, as with any institutional or governance structure. The
corrective is not to do away with the tenure system but to rein-
vigorate it by vitalizing both administrative and faculty respon-
sibility. There is a need for the institution to create incentives
to maintain commitment and hard work. The tenure system
works well for some faculty. Presumably, when all faculty are
hired there are similar expectations for performance. James
Bess asks, "... what caused performance to deviate from the ex-
pectation at the time of employment. Is it because faculty have
tenure (lifetime employment)? Or is it because the other system
rewards and sanctions are not part of the existing academic
structure."1
66
Every serious study of the tenure principle, including those
that were commenced to find alternatives, have concluded there
is no better one. 167 Academic tenure remains the worst form of
university employment save all of the others. Tenure continues
to be the best mechanism for creating an atmosphere conducive
to pursuit of disinterested scholarship wherever it will lead. It
promotes teaching, intellectual inquiry, and evaluation without
the deadening limits of orthodoxy and fear.
166. Bess, supra note 47, at 17. See One Study Finds Tenure Still has Cachet,
but Another Suggests Those Without are No Less Happy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
April 2, 1999, at A16.
167. See BOWEN & SHUSTER, supra note 42, at 240, state they were unable to
discover alternatives to the present system that they could recommend. They
conclude:
Perhaps the strongest argument for the continuation of the tenure system is
that it has proven to be a pretty durable institution. It is widely prevalent,
it is buttressed by an ancient and honorable tradition, it has proved to be
resilient against attack, it has generally been upheld by the courts, it has
been embraced within collective bargaining, and it commands the support of
most faculty.
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